The authors study the rivalry between two firms to develop an innovation in a dynamic setting that allows for post-development dissemination of the innovation, such as licensing or imitation. This dissemination may cause the noninnovating firm to benefit from the discovery. When this occurs,...

The author examines third-degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist in an intermediate good market. Discrimination is motivated by the fact that downstream firms differ in their abilities to integrate backward into supply of the input. The author shows that under reasonable...

The authors analyze incomplete long-term contracts when buyers incur relationship-specific set-up costs and sellers choose product or service quality that is not verifiable to third parties. If set-up costs are observable, the first-best outcome can be achieved even though contracts cannot...

The authors analyze horizontal mergers in Cournot oligopoly. They find general conditions under which such mergers raise price, and show that any merger not creating synergies raises price. The authors develop a procedure for analyzing the effect of a merger on rivals and consumers and, thus,...