Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 85
Cover Image
Competitive Policy Development
Hirsch, Alexander V.; Shotts, Kenneth W. - In: American Economic Review 105 (2015) 4, pp. 1646-64
We present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies, yet agree on certain common objectives. Policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals. These investments are specific to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011211791
Cover Image
The Political Resource Curse
Brollo, Fernanda; Nannicini, Tommaso; Perotti, Roberto; … - In: American Economic Review 103 (2013) 5, pp. 1759-96
This paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of … transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor. These and other more specific …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815501
Cover Image
Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States
Campante, Filipe R.; Do, Quoc-Anh - In: American Economic Review 104 (2014) 8, pp. 2456-81
We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884821
Cover Image
Evolution and Intelligent Design
Sargent, Thomas J. - In: American Economic Review 98 (2008) 1, pp. 5-37
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005563556
Cover Image
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Comment
Kojima, Fuhito - In: American Economic Review 98 (2008) 1, pp. 561-62
Alesina and Tabellini (2007) investigate the normative criteria for allocating policy tasks to bureaucrats versus politicians. While they establish criteria with respect to a number of parameters, they do not give a criterion with respect to the degree of imperfect monitoring. We establish an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005241367
Cover Image
The Virtues of Hesitation: Optimal Timing in a Non-stationary World
Khan, Urmee; Stinchcombe, Maxwell B. - In: American Economic Review 105 (2015) 3, pp. 1147-76
In many economic, political, and social situations, circumstances change at random points in time, reacting is costly, and reactions appropriate to present circumstances may become inappropriate upon future changes, requiring further costly reaction. Waiting is informative if arrival of the next...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188465
Cover Image
The Economics of Climate Change
Stern, Nicholas - In: American Economic Review 98 (2008) 2, pp. 1-37
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005757111
Cover Image
Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies
Leaver, Clare - In: American Economic Review 99 (2009) 3, pp. 572-607
This paper develops a model in which a desire to avoid criticism prompts otherwise public-spirited bureaucrats to behave inefficiently. Decisions are taken to keep interest groups quiet and to keep mistakes out of the public eye. The policy implications of this "minimal squawk" behavior are at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014642
Cover Image
The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption
Verdier, Thierry; Acemoglu, Daron - In: American Economic Review 90 (2000) 1, pp. 194-211
Because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another, it creates room for corruption. As … corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention, governments will try to prevent it. They may create rents for … bureaucrats, induce a misallocation of resources, and increase the size of the bureaucracy. Since preventing all corruption is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572925
Cover Image
Estimating the Value of Political Connections
Fisman, Raymond - In: American Economic Review 91 (2001) 4, pp. 1095-1102
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005758492