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Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination

Helfrich, Magdalena; Herweg, Fabian - 2016

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups. Two cases are analyzed: (i) Best-response symmetries so that profits in the static Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434582

Transparency and tacit collusion in a differentiated market

Schultz, Christian - 2002

This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from underbutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409987

Vertical integration and downstream collusion

Biancini, Sara; Ettinger, David - 2016

We investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms' ability to collude in a repeated game framework. We show that a vertical merger has two main effects. On the one hand, it increases the total collusive profits, increasing the stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011482885

Optimal cross-licensing arrangements : collusion versus entry deterrence

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2018

This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011873750

Multi-market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2009

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We … show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel … stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850139

Gender and collusion

Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938866

Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

Policy innovations, political preferences, and cartel prosecutions

Ghosal, Vivek; Sokol, D. Daniel - 2015

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing … penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346282

Collusion by algorithm: the role of unobserved actions

Martin, Simon; Rasch, Alexander - 2022

We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093034

Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm

Madio, Leonardo; Pignataro, Aldo - 2022

incentive to deviate from a cartel. We also present conditions for the emergence of a partial cartel, with the capacity … small firm induces a partial conspiracy that is Pareto-dominant. Implications for cartel identification and enforcement are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013473721