This paper analyzes whether owners of firms have incentives to delegate their long-run decisions to managers or not. The result arising from our analysis shows that owners do have incentives to keep their long-run decisions (the location of the firm) to themselves. In this context we show that...

[EN] Stewart (1994) presents a model of endogenous entry. In his article Stewart proposes the following topic for future research: "An important feature of the model is that entry would be inefficient from the producers' point of view, and therefore never occurs in equilibrium. But in practice...

Also published as Working Paper DFAEII 2003-03

A central unanswered question in economic theory is that of price formation in disequilibrium. This paper lays down the methodological groundwork for a model that has been suggested as an answer to this question (Arrow, 1959; Fisher, 1983; Hahn, 1989). We consider sellers that monopolistically compete...

Also published as Working Paper DFAEII 2003-01

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they sets up a multiproduct...

Also published as Working Paper Ikerlanak 2003-08