This paper proposes a model of asset-market equilibrium with portfolio delegation and optimal fee contracts. Fund managers and investors strategically interact to determine funds' investment profiles, while they share portfolio risk through fee contracts. In equilibrium, their investment...

We propose a dynamic asset-market equilibrium model in which (1) an "innovative" asset with as-yet-unknown average payoff is traded, and (2) investors delegate investment to experts. Experts secretly renege on investors' orders and take on leveraged positions in the asset to manipulate...

We identify an important channel through which political information propagates into capital markets—Washington policy analysts (WAs). WAs monitor political developments and produce research to interpret the impact of these events. Institutional clients generate superior returns on their...

We develop a general equilibrium model with intermediaries at the heart of international financial markets. Global intermediaries bargain with households and extract rents for providing access to foreign claims. The behavior of intermediaries, by tilting state prices, breaks monetary neutrality...

A key issue raised by the rapid growth of computerised algorithmic trading is how it responds in extreme situations. Using data on foreign exchange orders and transactions that includes identification of algorithmic trading, we find that this type of trading contributed to the deterioration of...

We develop a two-period general equilibrium model of portfolio delegation with competitive, differentially skilled managers and convex compensation contracts. We show that convex incentives lead to significant equilibrium mispricing, but reduce price volatility. In particular, price...

We develop a principal-agent model based on a sequential game played by a representative investor and a fund manager in an asymmetric information framework. The model shows that investors' perceptions of the fund market play the key role in the fund's fee-setting mechanism. The managers' true...

The paper studies liquidity provision by institutional investors using trade-level data. We find that hedge fund trades are a more important predictor of stock-level liquidity than mutual fund trades. However, hedge funds' liquidity provision is more exposed to financial conditions than that of...

This paper studies the eff ect of market belief risk on the cross-section of stock returns. Using actual and analyst EPS forecast data, we construct the market belief as the cross-sectional average of individual beliefs for all sample stocks, with individual belief de fined as the mean analyst...

Using comprehensive regulatory data, we examine trading by different investor types in government bond markets. Our sample covers virtually all secondary market trading in gilts and contains detailed information on each transaction, including the identities of both counterparties. We find that...