We study the optimal precision of public information disclosures about banksíassets quality. In our model the precision of information a§ects banksí cost of raising funding and asset proÖle riskiness. In an imperfectly competitive banking sector, banksístability and social surplus are...

We study a competitive banking sector in which banks choose the level of risk of their asset portfolios and, upon the public disclosure of stress test results, raise funding by promising investors a repayment. We show that competition forces banks to choose risky assets so as to promise...

We study public funding of banks and non-financial firms in a time of crisis. We find that bank capitalization is more effective in stabilizing the economy than direct funding to firms, but it also creates larger distortions. We show that the optimal, social-welfare-maximizing, structure of a...

​We build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, where the balance sheets of both banks and non-financial firms play a role in macro-financial linkages. We show that in equilibrium bank capital tends to be scarce, compared with firm capital. We study public funding of banks and firms...

This study applies a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of the European Central Bank's second series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO-II) on bank lending. Effects on corporate loans, loans for house purchase and loans for consumption are analysed...

We analyze the economic performance of di§erent monetary policy strategies, or rules, in a low interest rate environment, using simulations with a DSGE model which has been estimated for the euro area. We study how often the e§ective lower bound of interest rates (ELB) is likely to bind, and...