We study supervisory interventions in cross-border banks under different institutional architectures in a model in which a bank may provide voluntary support to an impaired subsidiary using resources from a healthy subsidiary. While a supranational architecture permits voluntary support, a...

We quantify the gains from regulating banks' maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic...

We develop a novel framework featuring loss amplification through firm-bank linkages. We use it to study optimal intervention in a lockdown situation that creates cash shortfalls for firms, which must resort to bank lending. Firms’ increased debt reduces their output due to moral hazard. Banks...

We develop an equilibrium model of the debt maturity choice of firms, in the presence of fixed issuance costs in the primary debt market, and search frictions in the secondary debt market. Liquidity in the secondary market is related to the ratio of buyers to sellers, which is determined in...

We build a competitive equilibrium model of securitization in the presence of demand for safety by some investors. Securitization allows to create safe assets by pooling idiosyncratic risks from loan originators, leading to higher aggregate loan issuance. Yet, the distribution of loan risks out...

We characterize policy interventions directed to minimize the cost to the deposit guarantee scheme and the taxpayers of banks with legacy problems. Non-performing loans (NPLs) with low and risky returns create a debt overhang that induces bank owners to forego profitable lending opportunities....

This paper characterizes the optimal banking union with endogenous participation in a two-country economy in which domestic bank failures may be contemporaneous to sovereign crises, giving rise to risk-sharing motives to mutualize bail-out funding. Raising public funds to conduct bail-outs...

The post-crisis regulatory framework has fostered the development of the contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) market. These instruments permit banks to absorb losses as a going concern but their critics warn that they could have potentially destabilizing effects in stress situations. We analyse...

At the beginning of the recent financial crisis, sponsoring banks rescued their structured investment vehicles (SIVs) despite having no contractual obligation to do so. I show that this outcome may arise as the equilibrium of a signaling game between banks and their debt investors when a...