In an otherwise unique-equilibrium model, agents are segmented into a few informational islands according to the signal they receive about others' expectations. Even if agents perfectly observe fundamentals, rational-exuberance equilibria (REX) can arise as they put weight on expectational...

The liquidity of financial system plays a central role in systemic crises. In this paper, we show that the ECB haircut policies provided an important liquidity support to distressed financial institutions during the euro area sovereign debt turmoil. Using novel, micro data on the pool of...

In general, empirical studies having evaluated with firm individual data the effects of structural labour market reforms in European countries do not reach unambiguous conclusions. In particular, they find that reforms increasing incentives to lower the number of temporary labour contracts do...

Nous proposons une premi ere tentative pour prendre en compte les engagements hors-bilan de l' Etat li es a l'assurance implicite des banques syst emiques dans une evaluation coh erente de la soutenabilit e budg etaire, pour 27 pays de l'Union europ eenne. Nous calculons d'abord des ecarts de...

This paper investigates the role of labor markets heterogeneity in a monetary union and especially what are the welfare gains/costs of labor market reforms for each member of the area. To this end, we develop a medium-scale two-country model representing a currency union characterized by price...

This paper deals with tests of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure on French, German, UK and US short-term interest rates. Three tests are examined: the first is based on forward rates and the other two are based on the interest rates spread. First, we show that the puzzle...

We analyze the influence of health and financial incentives on the retirement behavior of older workers in France, building upon Stock and Wise (1990) option value approach. The model accounts for three main retirement routes: the normal retirement, disability insurance (DI) and...