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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706

What drives motivated agents? : the "right" mission or sharing it with the principal

Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias - 2015

Motivated agents are characterized by increasing their effort if their work generates not only a monetary return for them but also a benefit for a mission they support. While their motivation may stem from working for their preferred (i.e., the `right') mission, it may also be the principal's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401176

Unravelling conditional cooperation : reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring in public goods provision

Cappelletti, Dominique; Güth, Werner; Ploner, Matteo - 2011

cooperation. We try to assess the relative importance of three motives - namely reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring - in … a non-linear voluntary contribution experiment. We find that, for those conditionally cooperating, both reciprocity and … reciprocity. In contrast, anchoring plays only a marginal role. Compared to what previously found in linear voluntary contribution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009313091

Hidden costs of control : three repetitions and an extension

Ploner, Matteo; Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - 2010

We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) C5 and C10 treatments whose results largely conflict with those of the original study. We mainly observe hidden costs of control of low magnitude which lead to low-trust principal-agent relationships. We also report an extension where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943978

Productivity in contests : organizational culture and personality effects

Andersson, Ola; Huysentruyt, Marieke; Miettinen, Topi; … - 2010

We study the interaction of organizational culture and personal prosocial orientation in team work where teams compete against each other. In a computerized lab experiment with minimal group design, we prime subjects to two alternative organizational cultures emphasizing either self-enhancement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003989034

On the Prudence of Rewarding A While Hoping For B

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2003

In multiple-task hidden-action models, the (mis-)allocation of effort may play an important role for benefit creation. Signals which capture this benefit and which are used in incentive schemes should thus not only be judged by the noise and the associated costs but also by the mis-allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263061

Wage floors and optimal job design

Kragl, Jenny; Schöttner, Anja - 2011

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293373

Committing to incentives : should the decision to sanction be revealed or hidden?

Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - 2010

Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships. While there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact reduce compliance by crowding-out intrinsic motivation. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944178

Experimentally Observed Imitation and Cooperation in Price Competition on the Circle

Selten, Reinhard; Apesteguia, José - 2002

willingness to pay. Experiments, extended over 200 periods, were run with 3, 4, and 5 participants. Subjects did not receive any …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270575

Experimentally Observed Imitation and Cooperation in Price Competition on the Circle

Selten, Reinhard; Apesteguia, Jose - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002

willingness to pay. Experiments, extended over 200 periods, were run with 3, 4, and 5 participants. Subjects did not receive any …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032209