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Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Gilles, Robert Paul - 2005

A network payoff function assigns a utility to all participants in a (social) network. In this paper we discuss properties of such network payoff functions that guarantee the existence of certain types of pairwise stable networks and the convergence of certain network formation processes. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263150

Network Potentials

Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Gilles, Robert P. - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968375

Market Structure and Matching with Contracts

Westkamp, Alexander - 2010

generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents’ preferences satisfy same side … contract with each other are jointly necessary and sufficient for (i) the equivalence of group and chain stability, (ii) the … core stability of chain stable networks, (iii) the efficiency of chain stable networks, (iv) the existence of a group …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270419

Market Structure and Matching with Contracts

Westkamp, Alexander - University of Bonn, Germany - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008477267

Invader Strategies in the War of Attrition with Private Information

Metzger, Lars Peter - 2011

Second price allpay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if valuations are private information. I show that for any level of uncertainty there exists a pure deviation strategy close to the equilibrium strategy such that for some valuations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312970

Sandbagging

Kräkel, Matthias - 2011

Participants of dynamic competition games may prefer to play with the rules of the game by systematically withholding effort in the beginning. Such behavior is referred to as sandbagging. I consider a two-period con- test between heterogeneous players and analyze potential sandbagging of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312971

Through Trial & Error to Collusion - The Discrete Case

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Jörg - 2000

In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317631

Achieving the First Best in Sequencing Problems

Mitra, Manipushpak - 2000

In a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317633

Does Information Matter? Some Experimental Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Game

Apesteguia, Jose - 2001

This paper analyzes the effect of the availability of information about the payoff structure on the behavior of players in a Common-Pool Resource game. Six groups of six individuals played a complete information game, while other six groups played the same game but with no information about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317639

Imitation Equilibrium

Selten, Reinhard; Ostmann, Axel - 2000

The paper presents the concept of an "imitation equilibrium" and explores it in the context of some simple oligopoly models. The concept applies to normal form games enriched by a "reference structure" specifying a "reference group" for every player. The reference group is a set of other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317643