Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 143
Cover Image
Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments Revisited
Kräkel, Matthias - 2011
The paper addresses the problem of optimally matching heterogeneous players in a two-stage two-type Lazear-Rosen tournament in which the semifinal losers are eliminated. The organizer of the tournament can either choose two homogeneous semifinals -- one between two strong players and the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312984
Cover Image
Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments Revisited
Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2011
The paper addresses the problem of optimally matching heterogeneous players in a two-stage two-type Lazear-Rosen tournament in which the semifinal losers are eliminated. The organizer of the tournament can either choose two homogeneous semifinals -- one between two strong players and the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651599
Cover Image
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points
Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2005
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where a publicly announced reserve price has some influence on the reference point. It turns out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263146
Cover Image
When Queueing is Better than Push and Shove
Gerskov, Alex; Schweinzer, Paul - 2006
We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263167
Cover Image
Ascending combinatorial scoring auctions
Rieck, Thomas - 2009
?uence the performance of the auction mechanism. We generalize the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction to such an environment … possible to keep the scoring rule secret without changing the outcome of the auction. Additionally, for additive scoring rules … a close connection to the original proxy auction exists. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270005
Cover Image
Signaling in First-Price Auctions
Rieck, Thomas - 2010
learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete asymmetric first-price auction setting, we show that a bidder may indeed …-price auction model. Finally, we use a specific signaling structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293376
Cover Image
Risk and Expected Utility Theory
Rieck, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2009
?uence the performance of the auction mechanism. We generalize the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction to such an environment … possible to keep the scoring rule secret without changing the outcome of the auction. Additionally, for additive scoring rules … a close connection to the original proxy auction exists. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735013
Cover Image
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points
Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W. - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005
We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where a publicly announced reserve price has some influence on the reference point. It turns out...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989626
Cover Image
When Queuening is Better than Push and Shove
Gershkov, Alex; Schweinzer, Paul - University of Bonn, Germany - 2006
We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001502
Cover Image
Panel Data Models with Unobserved Multiple Time - Varying Effects to Estimate Risk Premium of Corporate Bonds
Bada, Oualid; Kneip, Alois - University of Bonn, Germany - 2010
We use a panel cointegration model with multiple time- varying individual effects to control for the enigmatic missing factors in the credit spread puzzle. Our model specification enables as to capture the unobserved dynamics of the systematic risk premia in the bond market. In order to estimate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671393