We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private … bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as … overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important implications on equilibrium behavior. We …

This article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has been designed to test the … data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction … experiments of revealing only the winning bid after each auction. By means of learning direction theory we explain the individual …

Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own …

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction …

ineffcient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the …

value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and … speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders, the value distribution, and the …