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Market Structure and Matching with Contracts
Westkamp, Alexander - 2010
Ostrovsky [10] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a … generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents’ preferences satisfy same side … contract with each other are jointly necessary and sufficient for (i) the equivalence of group and chain stability, (ii) the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270419
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Market Structure and Matching with Contracts
Westkamp, Alexander - University of Bonn, Germany - 2010
Ostrovsky [10] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a … generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents’ preferences satisfy same side … contract with each other are jointly necessary and sufficient for (i) the equivalence of group and chain stability, (ii) the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008477267
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An analysis of the German university admissions system
Westkamp, Alexander - 2012
. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a \emph{stability} condition that is adapted to the … notion of \emph{procedural stability}. Two simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312980
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An analysis of the German university admissions system
Westkamp, Alexander - University of Bonn, Germany
. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a \emph{stability} condition that is adapted to the … notion of \emph{procedural stability}. Two simple assumptions guarantee existence of a student optimal procedurally stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535252
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Network Potentials
Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Gilles, Robert Paul - 2005
A network payoff function assigns a utility to all participants in a (social) network. In this paper we discuss properties of such network payoff functions that guarantee the existence of certain types of pairwise stable networks and the convergence of certain network formation processes. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263150
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Network Potentials
Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Gilles, Robert P. - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005
A network payoff function assigns a utility to all participants in a (social) network. In this paper we discuss properties of such network payoff functions that guarantee the existence of certain types of pairwise stable networks and the convergence of certain network formation processes. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968375
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Achieving the First Best in Sequencing Problems
Mitra, Manipushpak - 2000
In a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317633
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Simple Sequencing Problems with Interdependent Costs
Mitra, Manipushpak; Hain, Roland - 2001
In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317646
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Incomplete Information and Multiple Machine Queueing Problems
Mitra, Manipushpak - 2001
In mechanism design problems under incomplete information, it is generally difficult to find decision problems that are first best implementable. A decision problem under incomplete information is first best implementable if there exists a mechanism that extracts the private information and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317674
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Simple Sequencing Problems with Interdependent Costs
Mitra, Manipushpak; Hain, Roland - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001
In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968380