learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete asymmetric first-price auction setting, we show that a bidder may indeed … signal is not beneficial if it is too precise. The latter result carries over to a general continuous asymmetric first-price … auction model. Finally, we use a specific signaling structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be …

We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the … standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where a publicly announced reserve price has … some influence on the reference point. It turns out that the seller’s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of …

This article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has been designed to test the … data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction … experiments of revealing only the winning bid after each auction. By means of learning direction theory we explain the individual …

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction … trading is a substitute for price wars. Inparticular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly. …

is by enforcing a buy/sell option. Under its rules one partner has to offer a price for the partnership and the other … agent can choose whether she wants to sell her share or buy her partner's share at this price. It is well known that in a …

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction … trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly. …

We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the … standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where a publicly announced reserve price has … some influence on the reference point. It turns out that the seller’s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of …

?uence the performance of the auction mechanism. We generalize the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction to such an environment … possible to keep the scoring rule secret without changing the outcome of the auction. Additionally, for additive scoring rules … a close connection to the original proxy auction exists. …