Narrow search
Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Cover Image
The Impact of Resale on 2-Bidder First-Price Auctions where One Bidder?s Value is Commonly Known
Tröger, Thomas - 2004
ineffcient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the …). Resale always reduces all bidders' payoffs and increases the initial seller's revenue. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263121
Cover Image
Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
Garratt, Rod; Tröger, Thomas - 2005
In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263133
Cover Image
A note on Zheng’s conditions for implementing an optimal auction with resale
Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Tröger, Thomas - 2005
inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng's construction requires novel conditions on the bidders' value distribution profile … that the final allocation is obtained after a single resale transaction, regardless of the number of bidders. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263151
Cover Image
Collusion via Resale
Garratt, Rodney - 2008
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270002
Cover Image
The Impact of Resale on 2-Bidder First-Price Auctions where One Bidder's Value is Commonly Known
Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004
ineffcient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the …). Resale always reduces all bidders' payoffs and increases the initial seller's revenue. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968329
Cover Image
Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
Garrat, Rod; Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005
In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968344
Cover Image
Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information
Tröger, Thomas; Mylovanov, Tymofiy - University of Bonn, Germany - 2008
We consider the problem of mechanism design by a principal who has private information. We point out a simple condition under which the privacy of the principal's information is irrelevant in the sense that the mechanism implemented by the principal coincides with the mechanism that would be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968418
Cover Image
Collusion via Resale
Tröger, Thomas; Garratt, Rodney; Zheng, Charles - University of Bonn, Germany - 2008
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968458
Cover Image
A note on Zheng’s conditions for implementing an optimal auction with resale
Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005
inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng's construction requires novel conditions on the bidders' value distribution profile … that the final allocation is obtained after a single resale transaction, regardless of the number of bidders. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028507