Rabin proved that a low level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. Rabin's arguments strongly depend on expected utility theory, but we show that similar arguments apply to almost all non-expected...

A reasonable level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. This was demonstrated by Rabin for expected utility theory. Later, Safra and Segal extended this result by showing that similar arguments apply to...

Rabin proved that a low level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. Rabin’s arguments strongly depend on expected utility theory, but we show that similar arguments apply to general non-expected utility...

Rabin proved that a low level of risk aversion with respect to small gambles leads to a high, and absurd, level of risk aversion with respect to large gambles. Rabin's arguments strongly depend on expected utility theory, but we show that similar arguments apply to almost all non-expected...

This note shows that Machina's (1982) assumption that preferences over lotteries are smooth has some economic implications. We show that Frâ„chet differentiability implies that preferences represent second order risk aversion (as well as conditional second order risk aversion). This implies,...

We investigate the procedure of "random sampling" where the alternatives are random variables. When comparing any two alternatives, the decision maker samples each of the alternatives once and ranks them according to the comparison between the two realizations. Our main result is that when...