Showing 1 - 7 of 7
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968865
In this paper, we analyze capacity manipulation games in hospital-intern markets inspired by the real-life entry-level labor markets for young physicians seeking residencies at hospitals. In these markets, where the matching is determined by a centralized clearinghouse called the National...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027854
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributedto competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand forworkers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willingto make early...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302545
Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resem- bles models of the double coincidence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102620
In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102684
Mechanisms that rely on course bidding are widely used at Business Schools in order to allocate seats at oversubscribed courses. Bids play two key roles under these mechanisms: Bids are used to infer student preferences and bids are used to determine who have bigger claims on course seats. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005074096
We analyze mechanisms to kidney exchange with good samaritan donors where exchange is feasible not only among donor-patient pairs but also among such pairs and non-directed alturistic donors. We show that you request my donor-I get your turn mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1999]) is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005074124