This paper reports an experiment designed to elicit social preferences over income compensation schemes, where income differences between subjects have two independent components: one due to chosen effort and the other due to random chance. These differences can be compensated through social...

While economic crises tend to raise questions about a fair distribution of resources, less is known about whether and how fairness views themselves are affected by negative shocks. To answer this question, I conduct two experimental studies investigating the causal link between income shocks and...

We perform a comparative analysis of five incentivized tasks used to elicit risk preferences. Theoretically, we compare the elicitation methods in terms of completeness of the range of the estimates as well as their precision, the likelihood of triggering loss aversion, and problems arising when...

Cooperation norms often emerge in situations, where the long term collective benefits help to overcome short run individual interests, for instance in repeated Prisonerś Dilemma (PD) situations. Often, however, there are different paths to cooperation, benefiting different kinds of actors to...

Do individuals prefer to compete fairly, or unfairly with an opponent? We study individuals who can choose how to compete for one ex-post nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair...

We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of "self-governance". Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced....

How malleable are peopleś fairness ideals? Although fairness is an oft-invoked concept in allocation situations, it is still unclear whether and to what extent peopleś allocations reflect their fairness ideals. We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether peopleś fairness ideals vary...

Social lotteries are lotteries that are played along with someone else. The experimental literature indicates that risk attitudes depend on how one’s situation in the safe alternative compares to that of a peer. Evaluation of the risky alternative also depends on whether the lottery gives...

We propose and experimentally test a mechanism for a class of principal-agent problems in which agents can observe each others' efforts. In this mechanism each player costlessly assigns a share of the pie to each of the other players, after observing their contributions, and the final...

Humans make decisions jointly with others. They share responsibility for the outcome with their interaction partners. Today, more and more often the partner in a decision is not another human but, instead, a machine. Here we ask whether the type of the partner, machine or human, affects our...