Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N K= 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They face...

We study a model of political competition between two candidates with two orthogonal issues, where candidates are office motivated and committed to a particular position in one of the dimensions, while having the freedom to slect (credibly) any position on the other dimension. We analyse two...

The paper studies an evolutionary model where players from a given population are randomly matched in pairs each period to play a co-ordination game. At each instant, a player can choose to adopt one of the two possible behavior rules, called the rational rule and the aspiring rule, and then...

In this paper we study a model of political competition where citizens vote sincerely and candidates may be either citizens or Downsian politicians. The model extends the citizen-candidate model proposed by Osborne and Slivinski [1996] by including Downsian politicians similar to those studied...

We extend the 'citizen candidate' model of party formation to allow for aggregate uncertainty over the distribution of preferenecs in order to address free entry in some earlier research on electoral competition with aggregate uncertainty with a fixed number of parties. We discuss and...