We demonstrate that one should not expect convergence of the proposals to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer in standard ultimatum games. First, imposing strict experimental control of the behavior of the receiving players and focusing on the behavior of the proposers, we show...

We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability, the attention parameter, and then chooses the alternative that maximises a preference relation within the set of considered alternatives....

We compare three methods for the elicitation of time preferences in an experimental setting: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure (BDM), a second price auction and the multiple price list format. The first two methods have been used rarely to elicit time preferences. Although all methods...

In this paper we formulate and investigate experimentally a model of how individuals choose between sequences of monetary outcomes spread out in time. The theoretical model assumes that a decision-maker uses, in a sequential way, two criteria to screen options. Each criterion only permits a...