Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative...

We describe a new mechanism that explains the transmission of liquidity shocks from one security to another ("liquidity spillovers"). Dealers use prices of other securities as a source of information. As prices of less liquid securities convey less precise information, a drop in liquidity for...

We show that the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price is higher for firms cross-listed in the U.S. than for firms that never cross-list. This difference is strong, does not exist prior to the cross-listing date, and does not vanish over time after this date. Moreover, the impact of...

We develop a model of price formation in a dealership market where monitoring of the information flow requires costly effort. The result is imperfect monitoring, which creates profit opportunities for speculators, who do not act as dealers but simply monitor the information flow and quote...

We show that a cross-listing allows a firm to make better investment decisions because it enhances stock price informativeness. This theory of cross-listings yields a rich set of new predictions. In particular, it implies that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices should be larger for...

We develop a dynamic model of an order-driven market populated by discretionary liquidity traders. These traders must trade, yet can choose the type of order and are fully strategic in their decision. Traders differ in their impatience: less patient traders demand liquidity, more patient traders...

We test the hypothesis that individual investors contribute to the idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns because they act as noise traders. To this end, we consider a reform that makes short selling or buying on margin more expensive for retail investors relative to institutions, for a...

In many security markets, dealers trade with their regular clients at a discount relative to prevailing bid and ask quotes. In this article we provide an explanation to this phenomenon. We consider a dealer and an investor engaged in a long-term relationship. The dealer assigns a reputational...

We analyse the effect of concealing limit order traders’ identities on market liquidity. We develop a model in which limit order traders have asymmetric information on the cost of limit order trading (which is determined by the exposure to informed trading). A thin limit order book signals to...