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Capacity Choices in Liberalized Electricity Markets

Castro-Rodriguez, Fidel; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

absence of any regulation, private investment decisions on capacity unambiguously lead to a socially sub-optimal outcome, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792333

Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping

Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

There is a substantial theoretical literature on the potential effects of loyalty contracts, but a relative paucity of empirical work. This Paper employs the event study methodology to examine the effect of exclusionary contracts on firm performance in the ocean shipping industry. Shipping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497855

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Pools with Short-Lived Bids: An Application to the Spanish Market

García-Díaz, Antón; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We generalize von der Fehr and Harbord's (1993) multi-unit auction model for the case of a deterministic demand allowing for any technology mix and elastic demand in order to account for demand side bidding. We obtain a general characterization of the equilibrium and show that the Cournot model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789069

Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information

Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789071

A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773

Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The paper studies the impact of market integration on investment incentives in non-competitive industries. It distinguishes between investment in transportation and production cost-reducing technologies. Each domestic firm is controlled by a national regulator in a common market made of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012490

Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470

Regulation and Incentives in European Aviation

Gagnepain, Philippe; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

The aim of this Paper is to evaluate simultaneously market power and the incentives faced by carriers to improve efficiency, taking into account the regulatory changes that have affected the European airline industry. We construct and estimate a model that includes demand, capacity, and cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667136

Excess Entry, Vertical Integration and Welfare

Kühn, Kai-Uwe; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolistic input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry. We give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to Pareto improving vertical integration. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661460

Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Flochel, Thomas; Straub, Stéphane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969