We partnered with a micro-lender in Mali to randomize credit offers at the village level. Then, in no-loan control villages, we gave cash grants to randomly selected households. These grants led to higher agricultural investments and profits, thus showing that liquidity constraints bind with...

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is...

The investment decisions of small-scale farmers in developing countries are conditioned by their financial environment. Binding credit market constraints and incomplete insurance can reduce investment in activities with high expected profits. We conducted several experiments in northern Ghana in...

We measure the consequences of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the Italian lending market. We show that banks’ optimal price response to an increase in adverse selection varies with competition. Exploiting matched data on loans and defaults, we estimate models of demand for...

This paper develops a model of equilibrium in the market for loans. It focuses on the effects on equilibrium of (i) differences in the liability of the lender and the borrower for losses; and (ii) differences in the information available to the lender. We examine the different types of...

We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market and to advances in information...

This paper shows how the productive interplay of theory and experimental work has furthered our understanding of credit markets in developing countries. Descriptive facts motivated a body of theory, which in turned motivated experiments designed to test it. Results from these experiments reveal...

We look at the role of the financial sector in the context of the relatively backward regions of Southern Italy (the so-called Mezzogiorno). Commercial banks in the South typically have higher operating costs and charge higher interest rates than Northern banks. Econometric analysis on a large...

Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers issued by a major...

We measure the amount of income insurance and cross-sectional consumption smoothing (lending and borrowing) achieved within subgroups of states, such as regions or clubs, e.g. the club of rich states. We find that there is as much income insurance between, as well as within, regions. By...