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Privatization and Quality: Evidence from Elderly Care in Sweden
Bergman, Mats; Johansson, Per; Lundberg, Sofia; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084097
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Joint Ventures as a Commitment Device Against Lobbies
Berardi, Nicoletta; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
lobbying pressure are more likely than other firms to choose joint ventures as their corporate governance structure. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468544
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Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Flochel, Thomas; Straub, Stéphane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing … predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers …. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969
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Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections
Do, Quoc-Anh; Lee, Yen-Teik; Nguyen, Bang Dang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372
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The Proper Scope of Governments When Costs are Contractible
Dalen, Dag Morten; Moen, Espen R - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We discuss the relative merits of public and private ownership. Our starting point is the analysis of Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (HSV), who apply an incomplete contract framework to study the difference between private and public ownership. Our analysis departs from HSV’s model in two aspects....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124030
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Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks
Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
The government wants a certain good or service to be provided. Should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed? Building on the incomplete contracting approach, we argue that the initially specified quantity of an ex ante describable basic good can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497777
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Exclusive Contracts, Loss to Delay and Incentives to Invest
Groh, Christian; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
We model a new effect of exclusivity on non-contractible investments in buyer/seller relationships. By restricting the buyer to purchase from only one seller, exclusivity increases the buyer’s costs of haggling during renegotiation and hence the seller’s relative bargaining power and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497871
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Contract Enforcement, Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth
Ottaviano, Gianmarco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
The effects of the quality of institutions on economic development and comparative advantage have been so far investigated separately. This paper proposes a theoretical framework in which trade patterns and growth rates are jointly determined by international differences in contract enforcement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498068
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Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions
Dessein, Wouter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
The seminal work by Grossman and Hart (1986) made the study of firm boundaries susceptible to formal economic analysis, and illuminated an important role for markets in providing incentives. In this essay, I discuss some new directions that the literature has taken since. As a central challenge,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083406
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Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods
Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. In an incomplete contracting framework, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We show that this conclusion relies on their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083497