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Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

What is common to the following situations: incentivizing collective action in the presence of social preferences, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which unifies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084519

Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde

Anderson, Simon P; Engers, Maxim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

. Examples include market entry games, coordination games, and the bar-room game depicted in the movie 'A Beautiful Mind'. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662078

Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects

Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We introduce strategic waiting in a global game setting with irreversible investment. Players can wait in order to make a better informed decision. We allow for cohort effects and discuss when they arise endogenously in technology adoption problems with positive contemporaneous network effects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666707

It's All About Connections: Evidence on Network Formation

Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The game-theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792485

Network Structure and Strategic Investments: An Experimental Analysis

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

play in networks is to some extent boundedly rational, in the sense that coordination is influenced by local and individual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136539

Brothers in Alms? Coordination between NGOs on Markets for Development Donations

Aldashev, Gani; Marini, Marco; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper studies the stability of coordination between mission-driven non-governmental organizations (NGOs) competing … coordination under two classes of alliance-formation rules: unanimity and aggregative. If fundraising activities are strategic … complements, the grandcoalition (i.e. full coordination) is always individually stable and, under the unanimity rule …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784769

Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk-Sharing

Celentani, Marco; Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio; Desmet, Klaus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We analyse risk-sharing and endogenous fiscal spending in a two-region model with sequentially complete markets. Fiscal policy is determined by majority voting. When policy setting is decentralized, regions choose pro-cyclical fiscal spending in an attempt to manipulate security prices to their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656441

Price Wars in Finite Sequential Move Price Competition

Wallner, Klaus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper characterises the unique Markov equilibrium in the sequential move, finite horizon pricing duopoly with discounting. Simple, short cycles repeat until the last two periods. For discount factors above 0.75488, there are three-period reaction function cycles and below 0.75488,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504324

Distributional Conflict in Organisations

Inderst, Roman; Mueller, Holger M; Wärneryd, Karl - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Hierarchy can function as an instrument to channel influence activities or power struggles in organizations. Contrary to what has frequently been argued, we show that multi-divisional organizations may involve lower influence costs than single-tier organizations, even though they offer more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504716

Optimal Majority Rules and Enhanced Cooperation

Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

The decision-making rules of the European Union (EU) are defined in an incomplete contract signed by 15 national governments. The design of the contract defines the set of policy issues where it applies – in decision-making rules i.e. the majority rules and the division of powers among the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504730