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A Large-Market Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model
Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644035
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Self Control in Peer Groups
Battaglini, Marco; Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
People with a self-control problem often seek relief through social interactions rather than binding commitments. Thus, in self-help groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous etc, members are said to achieve better personal outcomes by mainly sharing their experiences. In other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656406
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Heterogeneity, Demand for Insurance and Adverse Selection
Spinnewijn, Johannes - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
heterogeneity in risks. I distinguish between heterogeneity in risk preferences and risk perceptions underlying the unexplained … heterogeneity, I find that the welfare conclusions regarding adversely selected markets are substantially different. The source of … heterogeneity is also essential for the evaluation of different interventions intended to correct inefficiencies due to adverse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083454
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Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data
Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
model of an incentive contract under moral hazard, taking into account agents heterogeneity in preferences. We show that … contracting farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity affects the principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656265
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Independence and Heterogeneity in Games of Incomplete Information
Mason, Robin; Valentinyi, Akos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
. Secondly, we show that if, in addition, there is sufficient heterogeneity of the conditional density of types, then the best …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114177
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Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration
Shin, Hyun Song - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
Should arbitrators adjudicate on the basis of their own investigations, or invite the interested parties to make their cases and decide on the basis of the information so gathered? I call the former the inquisitorial procedure in arbitration and the latter the adversarial procedure. I conduct a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504638
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International Trade and Finance under the Two Hegemons: Complementarities in the United Kingdom (1870-1913) and the United States (1920-30)
Taylor, Alan M.; Wilson, Janine - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
Do international trade and finance flow together? In theory, trade and finance can be substitutes or complements, so the matter must be resolved empirically. We study trade and financial flows from the United Kingdom from 1870 to 1913 and the United States in the interwar years. Trade and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504376
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Capital, Wages and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Almond, Douglas; Ciccone, Antonio; Peri, Giovanni - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
capital are around 80 percent. We also find strong complementarities between human capital and labor and substantial total …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497888
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Contracting With Synergies
Edmans, Alex; Goldstein, Itay; Zhu, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
This paper studies multi-agent optimal contracting with cost synergies. We model synergies as the extent to which effort by one agent reduces his colleague's marginal cost of effort. An agent's pay and effort depend on the synergies he exerts, the synergies his colleagues exert on him and,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083428
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Contracting With Synergies
Edmans, Alex; Goldstein, Itay; Zhu, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
This paper studies multi-agent optimal contracting with cost synergies. We model synergies as the extent to which effort by one agent reduces his colleague's marginal cost of effort. An agent's pay and effort depend on the synergies he exerts, the synergies his colleagues exert on him and,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083625