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Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper integrates the distributive politics literature with the literature on decentralization by incorporating …. The efficiency of decentralization and the performance of 'constitutional rules' (such as majority voting) which may be … used to choose between decentralization and centralization are then discussed in this framework. Stronger externalities and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789145

The Architecture of Federations: Constitutions, Bargaining, and Moral Hazard

Kessler, Anke; Luelfesmann, Christoph; Myers, Gordon M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

centralization and decentralization are suboptimal as long as political bargaining does not take place. With bargaining, however, the … first best can often be achieved under decentralization, but not under centralization. At the root of this result is the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662248

Strategic Asset Allocation in Money Management

Basak, Suleyman; Makarov, Dmitry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Money managers behave strategically when competing for fund flows within relatively small groups. We study strategic interaction between two risk-averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium dynamic investments. Driven by chasing and contrarian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144728

Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behaviour

Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We develop a model in which delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but may benefit from being friends with other criminals (by learning and acquiring proper know-how in the crime business). We first study the Nash equilibrium of this game by taking the social network...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114148

Estimating the Impact of Gubernatorial Partisanship on Policy Settings and Economic Outcomes: A Regression Discontinuity Approach

Leigh, Andrew - Research School of Economics, College of Business and … - 2007

Using panel data from US states over the period 1941-2002, I measure the impact of gubernatorial partisanship on a wide range of different policy settings and economic outcomes. Across 32 measures, there are surprisingly few differences in policy settings, social outcomes and economic outcomes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977260

Fiscal Federalism in Times of Crisis

Foremny, Dirk; von Hagen, Jürgen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We study the subnational fiscal adjustment to the Great Recession in a sample of European countries. We find that there are important differences between unitary and federal countries. Subnational governments in federal states reacted to the Great Recession by running larger budget deficits...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083379

Economic Reforms and Industrial Policy in a Panel of Chinese Cities

Alder, Simon; Shao, Lin; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We estimate the effect on economic development of China's industrial policy, in particular, the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). We use data from a panel of 276 Chinese cities and prefectures from 1988 to 2010. Our difference-in-difference estimator exploits the variation in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084232

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Bordignon, Massimo; Nannicini, Tommaso; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We compare single round vs runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy and hence policy volatility is smaller, because the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145395

On the Optimal Structure of Local Governments

Hochman, Oded; Pines, David; Thisse, Jacques-François - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

We show that space matters in designing the optimal provision of local public goods (LPGs). Geography imposes particular institutional structure of local governments due to the overlapping of market areas associated with different LPGs. The optimum can be decentralized through local governments...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656169

Performance Incentives with Award Constraints

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper studies the provision of incentives in a large US training organization, which is divided into about 50 independent pools of training agencies. The number and the size of the agencies within each pool vary greatly. Each pool distributes performance incentive awards to the training...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661877