Similar Search Results

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

-reputation over one’s willpower, which potentially transforms lapses in a personal rule into precedents that undermine future self … inferences from their own past actions. We thus model the behaviour of individuals who are unsure of their willpower (ability to … so afraid of appearing weak to himself that every decision becomes a test of his willpower, even when self-restraint is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136762

Self-Confidence: Intrapersonal Strategies

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

provides a formal account of (endogenously) selective memory or awareness, such as the tendency to remember one's successes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136755

Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

International surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate. At the same time, social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504312

Identity, Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We analyze social and economic phenomena involving beliefs which people value and invest in, for affective or functional reasons. Individuals are at times uncertain about their own 'deep values' and infer them from their past choices, which then come to define 'who they are'. Identity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661790

Group versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines

Giné, Xavier; Karlan, Dean S. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656151

Does Prestige Matter More than Profits? Evidence from Entrepreneurial Choice

Giannetti, Mariassunta; Simonov, Andrei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper investigates whether social norms play an important role in the decision to become an entrepreneur. We study whether the individual decision to become an entrepreneur or entrepreneurial income are affected by the decisions of other individuals living in the same municipality. To...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124089

Clubs and Households

Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The relationship between our general equilibrium model with multimember households and club models with multiple private goods is investigated. The main distinction in the definitions consists of the equilibrium concepts. As a rule, competitive equilibria among households where no group of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661913

Optimal Majority Rules and Enhanced Cooperation

Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

The decision-making rules of the European Union (EU) are defined in an incomplete contract signed by 15 national governments. The design of the contract defines the set of policy issues where it applies – in decision-making rules i.e. the majority rules and the division of powers among the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504730

The Politics of Compromise

Bonatti, Alessandro; Rantakari, Heikki - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

A team must select among competing projects that differ in their payoff consequences for its members. Each agent chooses a project and exerts costly effort affecting its random completion time. When one or more projects are complete, agents bargain over which one to implement. A consensus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083881

Flexible Integration as an Efficient Decision-Making Rule

Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

In this paper we combine a non-cooperative decision-making game in a federal structure with two levels of interest and an incomplete contract which sets the rules of the game. The question we pose is how to combine ex ante efficiency of the design with ex post efficiency of the outcomes in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123705