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Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple … collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a … strategies, this initial burst of collusion rapidly collapses. When unlimited pre-game communication is allowed via a chat window …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586

Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes

White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We investigate the outcome of bargaining when a player’s pay-off from agreement is risky. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because the presence of risk makes individuals behave 'more patiently' in bargaining....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666445

Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players’ decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792217

Pricing and Trust

Huck, Steffen; Ruchala, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792278

Price Wars in Finite Sequential Move Price Competition

Wallner, Klaus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper characterises the unique Markov equilibrium in the sequential move, finite horizon pricing duopoly with discounting. Simple, short cycles repeat until the last two periods. For discount factors above 0.75488, there are three-period reaction function cycles and below 0.75488,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504324

The effect of options on coordination

Araujo, Luis; Guimarães, Bernardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper studies how constraints on the timing of actions affect equilibrium in intertemporal coordination problems. We show that while the possibility of waiting longer for others'’ actions helps agents to coordinate in the good equilibrium, the option of delaying one’s' actions harms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084663

Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects

Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We introduce strategic waiting in a global game setting with irreversible investment. Players can wait in order to make a better informed decision. We allow for cohort effects and discuss when they arise endogenously in technology adoption problems with positive contemporaneous network effects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666707

Complementarities and Games: New Developments

Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

The theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games is presented as the appropriate tool to model complementarities. The approach, which has not yet been fully incorporated into the standard toolbox of researchers, makes the analysis intuitive and simple, helps in deriving new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123543

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124002

The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Englmaier, Florian; Roider, Andreas; Sunde, Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084038