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Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

principals who control. The reason is that most agents lower their performance as a response to the signal of distrust created by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124063

The Catch-22 of External Validity in the Context of Constraints to Firm Growth

Fischer, Greg; Karlan, Dean S. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We document the presence of multiple and varied constraints to small and medium firm growth. This presents both a practical problem for business training programs and a challenge to academic economists trying to identify mechanisms though which these programs may affect outcomes. External...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011184078

Five Open Questions About Prediction Markets

Wolfers, Justin; Zitzewitz, Eric - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Interest in prediction markets has increased in the last decade, driven in part by the hope that these markets will prove to be valuable tools in forecasting, decision-making and risk management - in both the public and private sectors. This paper outlines five open questions in the literature,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504341

Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence from Commitment via International Trade Agreements

Limão, Nuno; Tovar, Patricia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Why do governments employ inefficient policies to redistribute income towards special interest groups (SIGs) when more efficient ones are available? To address this puzzle we derive and test predictions for a set of policies where detailed data is available and an efficiency ranking is feasible:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136624

Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly

Jun, Byoung; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We compare steady states of open loop and locally stable Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in a general symmetric differential game duopoly model with costs of adjustment. Strategic incentives depend on whether an increase in the state variable of a firm hurts or helps the rival and on whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661729

Ownership and Control of German Corporations

Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relation of ownership to control in Germany is therefore … is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the … holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits from control changes and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666867

The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and Control

Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin; Rossi, Stefano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

the subsequent 100 years, and comparing the pattern of ownership and control with a sample incorporated around 1960. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123634

Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?

Franks, Julian R; Mayer, Colin; Renneboog, Luc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

restructuring, investors focus control on poorly performing companies. These results stand in contrast to the US, where there is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124256

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of … strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468606

An Institutional Theory of Momentum and Reversal

Vayanos, Dimitri; Woolley, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We propose a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio management. A competitive investor can invest through an index fund or an active fund run by a manager with unknown ability. Following a negative cashflow shock to assets held by the active fund, the investor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504572