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The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper analyses the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136464

The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting

Baldwin, Richard; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of Turkey's membership on EU voting. The aspects that we discuss are decision-making efficiency and the distribution of power in the EU's leading decision making body the Council of Ministers. We compare two alternative Council voting rules: those accepted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792179

The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament

Laruelle, Annick; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114157

A Theory of Reciprocity

Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner …'s dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, the theory explains why the same consequences trigger different reciprocal …’ whereas in competitive markets even extremely unfair distributions may arise. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791797

Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123667

Continuous Preferences Can Cause Discontinuous Choices: An Application to the Impact of Incentives on Altruism

Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Implementing incentive systems can sometimes backfire in practice: experimental evidence and folklore both suggest that offers of explicit rewards can expose surprising discontinuities in behaviour. This Paper models two such discontinuities that have been claimed by psychologists and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114276

Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem

Grüner, Hans Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

efficient mechanism with a balanced budget. This possibility theorem is not universal in the sense of Schweizer (Games and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504573

Product quality, competition, and multi-purchasing

Anderson, Simon P; Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

In a Hotelling duopoly model, we introduce quality that is more appreciated by closer consumers. Then higher common quality raises equilibrium prices, in contrast to the standard neutrality result. Furthermore, we allow consumers to buy one out of two goods (single-purchase) or both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083959

How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods?

Karlan, Dean S.; List, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We develop a simple theory which formally describes how charities can resolve the information asymmetry problems faced by small donors by working with large donors to generate quality signals. To test the model, we conducted two large-scale natural field experiments. In the first experiment, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084090

Self Control in Peer Groups

Battaglini, Marco; Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

People with a self-control problem often seek relief through social interactions rather than binding commitments. Thus, in self-help groups like Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous etc, members are said to achieve better personal outcomes by mainly sharing their experiences. In other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656406