Showing 1 - 10 of 803
his reputation for truth telling, we show that the larger the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792547
A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083847
This paper compares the properties of three electoral systems when voters have imperfect information. Imperfect information blurs voter decisions and may divorce the electoral outcome from the true preferences of the electorate. The challenge for electoral design is therefore to translate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662251
credibility as a commitment device. But the contract’s strength is that renegotiation can be very visible and this facilitates a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124190
The paper develops a political economy model to assess the interplay between political party formation and an environmental policy dimension viewed as secondary to the redistributive dimension. We define being a secondary issue in terms of the intensity of preferences over this issue rather than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498009
Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083955
How do foreign interests influence the policy determination process? What are the welfare implications of such foreign influence? In this paper we develop a model of foreign influence and apply it to the study of optimal tariffs. We develop a two-country voting model of electoral competition,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661468
Different electoral rules provide different incentives for parties competing for votes to adopt emerging issues. As a result, new societal issues will be integrated at different speeds into the political arena, and ultimately, into policy. In order to study this question formally, I propose an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666941
We study and compare equilibrium platforms in models of one-dimensional electoral competition with two and four policy-motivated parties. We first analyse the plurality game, where the party that gets the most votes is elected and implements its proposed platform. Restrictions on the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666975
Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136600