volunteer contract often offered for this type of task, whereas agents in the three treatment groups receive small financial …-financial rewards are more effective at eliciting effort than either financial rewards or the volunteer contract. The effect of …

We analyse the optimal delegation of decision rights by a uninformed principal to an informed but biased agent. When … his preferred one. We fully characterize the optimal delegation set for general distributions of the state space and … delegation sets to be optimal. Finally, we show that the optimal delegation set takes the form of a single interval if the agent …

We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal to a better informed but biased agent. In an … world. We characterize the optimal delegation schemes for all discount rates and show that they resemble organizational … arrangements that are commonly observed, including centralization and threshold delegation. For small biases threshold delegation …

Why do firms delegate job design decisions to workers, and what are the implications of such delegation? We develop a … private-information based theory of delegation, where delegation enables high-ability workers to signal their ability by … delegation: when market observability of job content is high, the compensation needed to get low ability workers to self-sort is …