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Corneo, Giacomo; Rob, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We develop a theoretical framework for comparing the style of work in public and private enterprises. We incorporate ‘socializing’, as an activity that yields utility for workers and affects a firm’s output, into a simple multitask model of work organization. In contrast with previous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791698

Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising

Fan, Ying; Kühn, Kai-Uwe; Lafontaine, Francine - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Financial constraints are an important impediment to the growth of small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically how the financial constraints of agents affect their decisions to exert effort, and, hence the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084668

Privately versus Publicly Optimal Skin in the Game: Optimal Mechanism and Security Design

Chemla, Gilles; Hennessy, Christopher - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We examine screening incentives, welfare and the case for mandatory skin-in-the-game. Ex ante banks can screen, using interim private information to choose retentions and structuring. Ex post speculators trade with rational hedging investors. Absent regulation, there is a separating equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024483

Travel Demand Model with Heterogeneous Users and Endogenous Congestion: An application to optimal pricing of bus services

Batarce, Marco; Ivaldi, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We formulate and estimate a structural model for travel demand, in which users have heterogeneous preferences and make their transport decisions considering the network congestion. A key component in the model is that users have incomplete information about the preferences of other users in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493565

Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks

Frisell, Lars; Roszbach, Kasper F.; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Recent research on central bank governance has focused mainly on their monetary policy task. As the sub-prime loan … also in ensuring their soundness and stability. In this paper we study the specific corporate governance structures of a … public governance literatures, where present. Our analysis highlights a striking variety in central bank governance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656403

Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229

Specific Knowledge and Performance Measurement

Raith, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper examines optimal incentives and performance measurement in a setting where an agent has specific knowledge about the consequences of their actions for the principal. I study incentive contracts in which the agent’s compensation can be based on both ‘input’ measures closely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504471

Punishment Without Crime? Prison as a Worker-Discipline Device

Miller, Marcus; Smith, Jennifer C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

An ‘efficiency wage’ model developed for Western economies is reinterpreted for Soviet Russia assuming that it was the Gulag not unemployment that acted as a ‘worker-discipline device’. Archival data now available allows for a basic account of the dynamics of the Gulag to be estimated....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504586

Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration

Shin, Hyun Song - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

Should arbitrators adjudicate on the basis of their own investigations, or invite the interested parties to make their cases and decide on the basis of the information so gathered? I call the former the inquisitorial procedure in arbitration and the latter the adversarial procedure. I conduct a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504638

Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts

Bisin, Alberto; Guaitoli, Danilo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard (hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium is determined by the interaction of financial intermediaries. The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is that intermediaries are restricted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497778