We study a continuous time model of a levered firm with fixed assets generating a cash flow that fluctuates with business conditions. Since external finance is costly, the firm holds a liquid (cash) reserve to help survive periods of poor business conditions. Holding liquid assets inside the...

We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly...

We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don’t know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms....

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately informed 'monopolistic' insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The...

We formulate a market microstructure model of exchange determination we employ to investigate the impact of informed trading on exchange rates and on foreign exchange (FX) market conditions. With our formulation we show how strategic informed agents influence exchange rates via both...

We analyze the effect that real-time domestic and foreign news about fundamentals have on the correlation of stock returns of a small open economy, Portugal, and a large open economy, the U.S. We also study the role of public and private information in the price formation process in the U.S. and...

We develop a multi-period model of strategic trading in an asset market where traders are uncertain about market liquidity. In our model, informed traders strategically trade against competitive market makers to exploit their short-lived private information. Unlike market makers, informed...

This paper studies international equity markets when some investors have private information that is valuable for trading in many countries simultaneously. We use a dynamic model of equity trading to show that 'global' private information helps understand US investors’ trading behaviour and...

We show that international home bias in bond and equity holdings declined during the late 1990s at the same time as international risk sharing increased. Also, countries with less home bias, on average, tended to obtain more risk sharing in international markets. Using panel data estimations, we...

I characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long-run oligopolistic competition. When managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on ‘income smoothing’ – manager-led firms can sustain collusive...