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Competition for attention in the information (overload) age

Anderson, Simon P; de Palma, André - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Limited consumer attention limits product market competition: prices are stochastically lower the more attention is paid. Ads compete to be the lowest price with other ads from the same sector and they compete for attention with ads from other sectors: equilibrium sector ad shares under free...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000441

To Charge or Not to Charge: Evidence from a Health Products Experiment in Uganda

Fischer, Greg; Karlan, Dean S.; McConnell, Margaret; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

model combining the learning aspect of experience goods with reference-dependent preferences, we setup a field experiment in … Northern Uganda in which three health products differing in their scope for learning were initially offered either for free or … for sale at market prices. In line with prior studies, when the product has potential for positive learning, we do not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083717

Indeterminacy in a Finance Constrained Unionized Economy

Lloyd-Braga, Teresa; Modesto, Leonor - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We introduce labour market imperfections (i.e. unions and the existence of a wage floor) in a finance-constrained monetary economy with heterogenous agents and increasing returns to scale due to labour and capital productive externalities. We find that indeterminacy emerges for empirically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504720

Arbitrage, Hedging and Financial Innovation

Davidson, Malcolm - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

I present a simple model in which it is possible that opening a new market makes everybody worse off. Unlike previous examples in the literature, the analysis does not rely on relative price changes of different consumption goods. This is shown in a standard framework in which uninformed traders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504789

Evaluating Welfare Losses Under R&D Rivalry and Product Differentiation

Katsoulacos, Yannis; Ulph, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

We evaluate the social welfare loss (WL) that arises in an oligopolistic industry under technological competition and product differentiation. The main novelty of our approach concerns the decomposition of the WL into `dynamic' losses (from too little cost reduction and an inappropriate number...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791632

A Pure Theory of Job Security and Labour Income Risk

Bertola, Giuseppe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Models of labour market equilibrium where forward-looking decisions maximize both profits and labour income on a risk-neutral basis, offer valuable insights into the effects of employment protection legislation. Since risk-neutral behaviour in the labour market presumes perfect insurance,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791651

Hold-Up Problems and Firm Formation

Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Agents from a homogeneous population organize themselves into productive partnerships and are confronted with a hold-up problem when making relation-specific investments in those partnerships. The problem is mitigated if agents can leave a partnership in which they have invested, bear the costs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498121

Reform Without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition

Lau, Lawrence J; Qian, Yingyi; Roland, Gérard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

We develop a simple model to analyse the ‘dual-track’ approach to transition to a market economy as a mechanism for implementing efficient Pareto-improving economic reform, that is, reform achieving efficiency without creating losers. The approach, based on the continued enforcement of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504255

Optimal Government Regulations and Red Tape in an Economy with Corruption

Mendez, Fabio; Sepulveda, Facundo - Research School of Economics, College of Business and … - 2006

We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in entrepreneurial ability, and may decide to become workers or entrepreneurs. The government is motivated by a production externality to impose regulations on entrepreneurship, and sets a level of red tape -administered by public officials-to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032856

Efficiency Properties of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information

Gottardi, Piero; Rahi, Rohit - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainty. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136439