Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterizing an international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the...

We present identification and estimation results for the 'collective' model of labour supply in which there are discrete choices, censoring of hours and non-participation in employment. We derive the collective restrictions on labour supply functions and contrast them with restrictions implied...

We construct a structural model of household decision-making and matching and estimate the returns to schooling within marriage. We consider agents with idiosyn- cratic preferences for marriage that may be correlated with education, and we allow the education levels of spouses to interact in...

We consider a simple model of competition under moral hazard with constant return technologies. We consider preferences that are not separable in effort: marginal utility of income is assumed to increase with leisure, especially for high-income levels. We show that, in this context, Bertrand...