Similar Search Results

Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions

Cohen, Chen; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study asymmetric all-pay auctions with multiple objects where players’ values for the objects are common knowledge …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504495

Procurement Favouritism and Technology Adoption

Branco, Fernando - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

The design of cost minimizing procurement rules for the selection of contractors among distinct technological groups requires the favouritism of inefficient firms. It is unclear whether these policies provide incentives for inefficient firms to adopt more efficient technologies. In this paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504568

Using and Abusing Economic Theory

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

politically important. I illustrate with some disastrous government auctions, but also show the value of economic theory. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498003

Multi-object Auctions: On the Use of Combinational Bids

Branco, Fernando - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

This paper studies multiple object auctions when there are two kinds of bidders: those interested in the bundle being …-price auctions allows the implementation of the optimal mechanism, while a combination of first-price auctions does not. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498027

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976795

Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096108

Price Effects of Sovereign Debt Auctions in the Euro-zone: The Role of the Crisis

Beetsma, Roel; de Jong, Frank; Giuliodori, Massimo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

increase in anticipation of auctions of new issues and decrease after the auction, while no or a smaller such effect is present …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083630

Innovation, Competition, and Investment Timing

Koskinen, Yrjö; Mæland, Jøril - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

In our model multiple innovators compete against each other by submitting investment proposals to an investor. The investor chooses the least expensive proposal and when to invest in it. Innovators have to provide costly effort and they learn privately the cost of investing. Multiple efforts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084370

Reserve Price Effects in Auctions: Estimates from Multiple RD Designs

Choi, Syngjoo; Nesheim, Lars; Rasul, Imran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We present evidence from 260,000 online auctions of second-hand cars to identify the impact of public reserve prices on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201354

Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: an Experimental Investigation

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Otamendi, F. Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

bid for 3 goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145460