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negotiated and unobservable effort must be exerted to develop a product. In the absence of liability constraints, the inventor …'s investment incentives are increasing in his bargaining power. Yet, given limited liability, overinvestments may occur and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084016
The goal of this paper is to propose a simple paradigm for understanding rent seeking and corruption in the growth context. We develop an endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs, as intermediate-good producers, may engage in rent-seeking activities. The latter are defined by the following...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114275
The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084198
Prominent results of the property rights approach based on incomplete contracts as outlined by Hart (1995) say that all ownership structures lead to underinvestment and that joint ownership cannot be optimal, provided that investments are strategic complements and affect human capital only. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666964
In the standard property rights approach to the theory of the firm, joint ownership cannot be optimal, because it induces smaller investments in human capital than ownership by a single party. This result holds under the assumption that bargaining is always ex post efficient due to symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792483
Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504241
In a vertical market in which downstream firms have private information about their productivity and compete for consumers, an upstream firm posts public bilateral contracts. When downstream firms are risk-neutral without wealth constraints, the upstream firm offers the input to all retailers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083463
When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083501
This paper shows that the informativeness principle does not automatically extend to settings with limited liability …. Even if a signal is informative about effort, it may have no value for contracting. An agent with limited liability is paid … payment cannot fall further and so the principal cannot make use of the signal. Similarly, a principal with limited liability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083536
-neutrality and limited liability, where the optimal contract is a call option. The direct effect of reducing signal volatility is a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083624