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A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (Revised Version)

Legros, Patrick; Newman, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We present a perfectly-competitive model of firm boundary decisions and study their interplay with product demand, technology, and welfare. Integration is pri- vately costly but is effective at coordinating production decisions; non-integration is less costly, but coordinates relatively poorly....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083920

Strategic Search Diversion, Product Affiliation and Platform Competition

Hagiu, Andrei; Jullien, Bruno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

. Third, the effect of platform competition on search diversion incentives depends on the nature of competition. Competition … for advertising leads to more search diversion relative to competition for consumers. Both types of competition lead to at …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084110

Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries

Bloom, Nicholas; Van Reenen, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

competition is weak and/or when (b) family-owned firms pass management control down to the eldest sons (primo geniture). European … firms report lower levels of competition, while French and British firms also report substantially higher levels of primo … market competition and family firms account for about half of the long tail of badly managed firms and up to two thirds of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661978

Risk-bearing and Entrepreneurship

Newman, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

In the 'Knightian' theory of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs provide insurance to workers by paying fixed wages and bear all the risk of production. This paper endogenizes entrepreneurial risk by allowing for optimal insurance contracts as well as the occupational self-selection. Moral hazard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504306

The Demand for Coordination

Dessein, Wouter; Santos, Jesus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This paper endogenizes coordination problems in organizations by allowing for both ex ante coordination of activities, using rules and task guidelines, and ex post coordination, using communication and broad job assignments. It shows that: (i) Task specialization and the division of labour is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497860

Power in a Theory of the Firm

Rajan, Raghuram G; Zingales, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

Transactions take place in the firm rather than in the market because the firm offers agents who make specific investments power. Past literature emphasizes the allocation of ownership as the primary mechanism by which the firm does this. Within the contractibility assumptions of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498046

Do Prices Determine Vertical Integration? Evidence from Trade Policy

Alfaro, Laura; Conconi, Paola; Fadinger, Harald; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

What is the relationship between product prices and vertical integration? While the literature has focused on how integration affects prices, this paper shows that prices can affect integration. Many theories in organizational economics and industrial organization posit that integration, while...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084043

Rational Inattention and Organizational Focus

Dessein, Wouter; Galeotti, Andrea; Santos, Tano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We examine the allocation of scarce attention in team production. Each team member is in charge of a specialized task, which must be adapted to a privately observed shock and coordinated with other tasks. Coordination requires that agents pay attention to each other, but attention is in limited...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084079

Organizational Economics with Cognitive Costs

Garicano, Luis; Prat, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Organizational economics has advanced along two parallel tracks, one concerned with motivating agents with diverging objectives, the other--less developed--with coordinating agents under cognitive limits. This survey focuses on the second strand and attempts to bring the two strands together....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002388

Corporate Control and Executive Selection

Lippi, Francesco; Schivardi, Fabiano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We present a model in which the owner of the firm enjoys a private benefit from developing a personal relationship with the executives. This may lead the owner to retain a senior executive in office even though a more productive replacement is available. The model shows that the private returns...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677237