This paper analyses corporate risk choice when firms and their managers have private information regarding firm quality. Managers – representing themselves or shareholders – have a short time horizon and wish to boost the firm’s reputation in the market. Investors observe the firm’s...

Investors are keenly interested in financial reports of earnings because earnings provide important information for investment decisions. Thus, executives who are monitored by investors and directors face strong incentives to manage earnings. We introduce consideration of...

The book-building procedure for selling initial public offerings to investors has captured significant market share from auction alternatives in recent years, despite significantly lower costs in both direct fees and initial underpricing when using the auction mechanism. This Paper shows that in...

In 1997, France Télécom, the French telecommunications firm, went through a partial privatization. The government offered current and prior France Télécom employees the opportunity to buy portfolios of shares with various combinations of discounts, required holding periods, and levels of...

Stock prices react significantly to the tone (negativity of words) managers use on earnings conference calls. This reaction reflects reasonably rational use of information. “Tone surprise” -- the residual when negativity in managerial tone is regressed on the firm’s recent economic...