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Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791797

Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123667

Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice

Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084279

Continuous Preferences Can Cause Discontinuous Choices: An Application to the Impact of Incentives on Altruism

Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

, on this view, be crowded out by the introduction of explicit incentives; people may stop doing things they were …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114276

EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 versus Parliament 6

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper analyses bargaining between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) in the Conciliation Committee with the aim of evaluating both institutions' power in the European Union's codecision procedure. In contrast to other studies, which use power indices or simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114474

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656392

Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: Incentives, Separation and Voter Welfare

Hindricks, Jean; Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analysing how decentralization impacts upon incentive and selection effects, and thus on voter welfare. The model abstracts from features such as public good spillovers or economies of scale, so...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504327

Political Institutions and Economic Growth

Marsiliani, Laura; Renström, Thomas I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We analyze the impact of micro-founded political institutions on economic growth in an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals differ in preferences over a public good (as well as in age). Labour and capital taxes finance the public good and a public input. The benchmark institution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504348

Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt

Song, Zheng Michael; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of fiscal policy in a world comprising a set of small open economies, whose driving force is the intergenerational conflict over debt, taxes, and public goods. Subsequent generations of voters choose fiscal policy through repeated elections....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083405

Centralized decision making against informed lobbying

Costa Lima, Rafael; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

the model to the classical problem of local public goods provision and to the incentives towards the creation of customs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083471