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Cornelli, Francesca; Kominek, Zbigniew; Ljungqvist, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

that they are incompetent and when board power has increased following corporate governance reforms. In contrast, CEOs are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491717

Towards a Legal Theory of Finance

Pistor, Katharina - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

where the survival of the system is at stake; that is, at its core. Here, power becomes salient. This helps explain why …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084310

Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?

Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

governance, what matters most is not the legal power granted to minority shareholders but rather the absence of conflicts of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240

Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hamdani, Assaf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Public corporations live in a dynamic and ever-changing business environment. This Paper examines how courts and legislators should choose default arrangements in the corporate area to address new circumstances. We show that the interests of the shareholders of existing companies would not be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656367

Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hart, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership. Specifically, we analyse and compare three mechanisms: (1) proxy fights (voting only); (2) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123692

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

hostile bidders to win a vote of shareholder support – boards should not have veto power over takeover bids. The Paper …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124408

Buying to Sell: Private Equity Buyouts and Industrial Restructuring

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tåg, Joacim Ingemar - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We investigate how temporary ownership by private equity firms affects industry structure, competition and welfare. Temporary ownership leads to strong investment incentives because equilibrium resale prices are determined partly by buyers' incentives to block rivals from obtaining assets. These...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083585

The Structure of Corporate ownership in Privatized Utilities

Trillas, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The purpose of this Paper is to study the determinants of the concentration of ownership in a privatized, regulated firm. The discussion illustrates some aspects of the costs and benefits of different corporate systems. Privatized utilities are large firms with professional management: there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123598

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a ‘managerial power … show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones … CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

have power to influence their own compensation, and they use their power to extract rents. As a result, executives are paid …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123963