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We study the problem of financial contracting between a firm and outside investors when the firm cannot commit to future payouts, but assets can be contracted upon. By analyzing the renegotiation between firm and investors in default, we show that a capital structure with multiple investors...
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The paper presents a simple model of financial contracting for a long-term investment project in which early project termination may be an optimal response to information asymmetries. The paper characterizes when this constellation leads to inefficient short- term investment. It is shown that in...
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This paper develops an infinite-horizon model of financial institutions that borrow short-term and invest in long-term assets that can be traded in frictionless markets. Because these financial intermediaries perform maturity transformation, they are subject to potential runs. We derive distinct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333758
The recent financial crisis has shown that short-term collateralized borrowing may be a highly unstable source of funds in times of stress. The present paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model and analyzes under what conditions such instability can be a consequence of market-wide changes in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333794
We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334081
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