Showing 1 - 10 of 26
In this paper we examine financial interactions between tiers of government. Whilst most existing empirical evidence has focused on the US, it is difficult to generalize conclusions obtained to countries where the position and remit of lower tiers of government is evolving or is less clear...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010261062
Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions which contribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regions which benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor of such differentiated budgetary...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010261294
In the present article, Tiebout meets Laffont and Tirole in the land of Fiscal Federalism. We use a non-trivial Principal-Multi-Agent model to characterize the optimal intergovernmental grant schedule, when the cost of local public goods depends on hidden characteristics and actions of local...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010261345
This paper adds to the literature by utilizing improved data on tax revenue decentralization to re-examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the size of government. An econometric analysis using panel data from 18 OECD countries shows that fiscal decentralization matters for...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010261382
The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This paper investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264033
A simple theory suggests that a common form of federal horizontal equalization grants should cause subnational governments to levy higher tax rates, distorting local tax bases and so increasing federal transfers. To test this, I examine Canadian provincial tax policies in the 1972-2002 period....
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264074
Federal and state governments often differ in the capacity to pre-commit to expenditure and tax policy. Whether the implied sequence of public decisions has any efficiency implications is the subject of this paper. We resort to a setting which contrary to most of the literature does not exhibit...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264174
We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in a region comprising two districts, a city and a village. When districts remain autonomous and local public goods have positive spillover effects on the neighboring district, there is underprovision of public goods in both the city and...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264179
In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 617...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264387
The paper examines the question how fiscally strong and fiscally weak states respond to taxing autonomy at the state level, a subject that is currently under debate in Germany where states do have virtually no power to tax. We use a simple theoretical model that incorporates state surtaxes on...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010264393