We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study lying in ultimatum bargaining. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random information leaks, buyers can learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally...

This study provides new causal evidence for the impact of a large-scale natural disaster on local economic activity in Iran using nighttime light intensity. We apply the synthetic control method (SCM) and nighttime light (NTL) data from 1992 to 2020 for 31 provinces and 429 counties to study the...

This study examines the causal effect of the violent "Woman, Life, Freedom" protests in Iran during the last quarter of 2022 on individual life satisfaction. To evaluate the impact, we use two original representative surveys in Iran conducted in 2022. Our results, based on an ordered logit...

This study provides new causal evidence for the impact of a large-scale natural disaster on local economic activity in Iran using nighttime light intensity. We apply the synthetic control method (SCM) and nighttime light (NTL) data from 1992 to 2020 for 31 provinces and 429 counties to study the...

We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two tax regimes to fund a public good. The first-best tax regime imposes a general, distortion-free income tax. However, this tax cannot be enforced. The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specific commodity tax. This tax...

We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study lying in ultimatum bargaining. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random information leaks, buyers can learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally...

Endogenous timing can help to derive the time structure of decision making instead of assuming it as exogenously given. In our study we consider a homogeneous market where, like in the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), sellers determine sales capacities before prices. Sellers must serve...

A general framework is described specifying how boundedly rational decision makers generate their choices. Starting from a Master Module which keeps an inventory of previously successful and unsuccessful routines several submodules can be called forth which either allow one to adjust behavior...

Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules,...

By vetoing one questions mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996) we first elicit the responders' certainty equivalents for three different degrees of veto power. Afterwards...