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Gender and Collusion
Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022
Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013177648
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How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion: A Machine Learning Approach
Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa; Friedrichsen, Jana - 2022
-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit …This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free … sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013470283
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Taxation and market power
Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian; Müller, Wieland - 2009
We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332970
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Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust
Apesteguia, José; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Jörg; … - 2008
A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper, we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270592
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Supply Function Competition, Private Information, and Market Power: A Laboratory Study
Bayona, Anna; Brandts, Jordi; Vives, Xavier - 2016
In the context of supply function competition with private information, we test in the laboratory whether—as predicted in Bayesian equilibrium—costs that are positively correlated lead to steeper supply functions and less competitive outcomes than do uncorrelated costs. We find that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522505
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Gender and Collusion
Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger Andreas - 2022
Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals’ incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296722
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How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion : A Machine Learning Approach
Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana - 2022
-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit …This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free … sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243096
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Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation
Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2010
markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency … uncoordinated, multi-market contact allows firms to reduce the amount of self-reporting in equilibrium and sustain cartels more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274020
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Multi-market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement
Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2009
This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274005
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Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions
Ghosal, Vivek; Sokol, D. Daniel - 2015
-2003, and 2004-2013. Our empirical estimates show significant variation in the number of cartels prosecuted and the penalties … imposed across the policy regimes. The more recent regimes are characterized by far fewer cartels prosecuted, but with … cartels to larger and multinational firms. In terms of political effects, our results reveal no clear inter-political party …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011388208