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Stahl, Konrad O.; Strausz, Roland - 2011

-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274805

Umbrella branding and the provision of quality

Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - 2004

Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261118

Selling reputation when going out of business

Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - 2004

Is the reputation of a firm tradeable when the previous owner has to retire even though ownership change is observable? We consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners, observing only recent profits, bid for the firms on sale. Customers are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261210

Vertical product differentiation when quality is unobservable to buyers

Orosel, Gerhard O.; Zauner, Klaus G. - 2004

We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good's quality is unobservable to buyers before purchase, a continuum of quality levels is technologically feasible, and minimum quality is supplied under competitive conditions. After purchase the true quality of the good is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261256

Asymmetric information and overinvestment in quality

Belleflamme, Paul; Peitz, Martin - 2009

In a standard adverse selection world, asymmetric information about product quality leads to quality deterioration in the market. Suppose that a higher investment level makes the realization of high quality more likely. Then, if consumers observe the investment (but not the realization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264613

Making sense of non-binding retail-price recommendations

Buehler, Stefan; Gärtner, Dennis L. - 2010

We model non-binding retail-price recommendations (RPRs) as a communication device facilitating coordination in vertical supply relations. Assuming both repeated vertical trade and asymmetric information about production costs, we show that RPRs may be part of a relational contract,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270481

Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling

Bos, Olivier; Truyts, Tom - 2022

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077334

Optimal Redistribution in the Presence of Signaling

Bastani, Spencer; Blumḳin, Tomer; Micheletto, Luca - 2021

We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only … unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in … redistributing income and affecting signalling incentives is analyzed, as well as extended tax systems that combine income taxation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217555

Auctions with Signaling Concerns

Bos, Olivier; Truyts, Tom - 2021

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer … clock, affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders’ incentives to overbid …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315051

The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments

Kessler, Anke S.; Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2002

Human capital theory distinguishes between training in general-usage and firm-specific skills. In his seminal work, Becker (1964) argues that employers will not be willing to invest in general training when labor markets are competitive. However, they are willing to invest in specific training...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315423