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Reaching Market Equilibrium Merely by Bilateral Barters

Flåm, Sjur Didrik - 2013

Motivated by emission and resource markets, this paper considers repeated, bilateral barters between owners of commodity bundles, contingent claims, or property rights. Focus is on feasible, voluntary exchanges, driven only by differences in substitution rates. No coordination is ever needed....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328735

Aligning Profit Taxation with Value Creation

Richter, Wolfram F. - 2019

The OECD seeks to align transfer pricing and profit taxation with value creation but fails to provide a clear definition. This paper argues that value creation requires international cooperation and that the profit tax base should therefore be allocated according to standards commonly considered...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012872065

Optimization Over Graphs

Kwon, Suehyun - 2019

stability …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892085

Social Preferences and the Variability of Conditional Cooperation

Baader, Malte; Gächter, Simon; Lee, Kyeongtae; Sefton, … - 2022

We experimentally examine how the incentive to defect in a social dilemma affects conditional cooperation. In our first study we conduct online experiments in which subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma games with payoffs systematically varied across games. We find that few second...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077010

Super-Additive Cooperation

Efferson, Charles; Bernhard, Helen; Fischbacher, Urs; … - 2022

Repeated interactions provide a prominent but paradoxical hypothesis for human cooperation in one-shot interactions 1–3. Intergroup competitions 4–7 provide a different hypothesis that is intuitively appealing but heterodox. We show that neither mechanism reliably supports the evolution of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014240476

The Team Allocator Game : Allocation Power in Public Goods Games

Karakostas, Alexandros; Matzat, Dominik; Riewe, Gerhard; … - 2021

payoffs allows the team allocator to reward cooperating team members and to sanction non-cooperating members at no efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231971

Too Big to Prevail: The Paradox of Power in Coalition Formation

Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021

In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012582043

Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264578

Long persuasion games

Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric - 2006

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273734

Does central bank communication really lead to better forecasts of policy decisions? : new evidence based on a Taylor rule model for the ECB

Sturm, Jan-Egbert; de Haan, Jakob - 2009

central bank actions. We examine whether communication by the European Central Bank (ECB) adds information compared to the … ECB communication that are all based on the ECB President's introductory statement at the press conference following an … included in our Taylor rule model, the ECB communication indicators remain significant. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274048