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Lang, Matthias - 2014

evaluation indicates bad performance. The justification assures the agent that the principal has not distorted the evaluation …Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but … she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398669

Overwhelmed by Routine Tasks : A Multi-Tasking Principle Agent Perspective

Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - 2022

We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083473

Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2021

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013311715

Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers

Non, Arjan - 2011

. Furthermore, since some workers do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract … that simultaneously signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. Such a contract is characterised by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277387

Self-Confidence and Reactions to Subjective Performance Evaluations

Bellemare, Charles - 2019

Subjective performance evaluations are commonly used to provide feedback and incentives to workers. However, such evaluations can generate significant disagreements and conflicts, the severity of which may be driven by many factors. In this paper we show that a workers’ level of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892258

Learning from Failures : Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production

Khalil, Fahad - 2019

derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892041

Overwhelmed by Routine Tasks: A Multi-Tasking Principle Agent Perspective

Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013353365

Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority

Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010

We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensation-based and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270502

Social interaction, co-Worker altruism, and incentives

Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - 2008

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264500

Attention-Driven Demand for Bonus Contracts

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus - 2019

, competition does not eliminate but rather exacerbates inefficiencies arising from contracting with focused agents. Common contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890631